· incomplete knowledge. A basic presupposition of the non-monotonic and default industries seems to be that you cannot very often base such inferences on statistical knowledge. In part this presupposition is based on the feeling that "typicality" and "frequency'' mean different things. Be that as it may, in formalizing non-monotonic logics many people seem to be led to considerations that (not surprisingly!) mirror considerations appropriate to the �pplication of statistical knowledge.
Thus Etherington ( 1987) introduces the concept of preference among models; Konolige ( 1987) defines a notion of minimal extension; Touretzky (1986) gives a metric for inferential distance.
These ideas will be reflected in the principles governing the relvance of statistical knowledge to be discussed below. Our analysis of the ground-rules for the use of statistical knowledge will throw light on the "cancellation principles" of non-monotonic logic as well.
Assumptions.
The assumptions we make here are four. · ( 1}
We suppose that the knowledge base may have objective statistical knowledge in it. This statistical knowledge may be construed in a number of ways --for example as statements concerning chances or statements concerning frequencies in an arbitrarily long run. or statements concerning frequencies summed over possible worlds. We do suppose that these statements are general: that is that they do not represent the fact that we have recorded a frequency in a specific sample. We · .mu have done so, and gone on to infer a general statistical statement. But we also may have gotten our statistical knowledge from a handbook, or a dependable colleague. In any event, the statistical knowledge in our knowledge base is taken to be general scientific knowledge relating properties; we will write "�(A,.K) • p" to represent the fact that the long-run frequency A's among .R's is .a 1 We will weaken this assumption later to take account of approximate statistical knowledge. The long run frequency of A 's may be about p, or at least q.
(2)
We assume that our body of knowledge--our background knowledge --determines equivalence classes of the statements whose uncertainty concerns us. Sand Tare in the same equivalence class if we know that they have the same truth values: that is, if and only if the truth functional biconditional S 0 Tis part of our knowledge. Thus if we know that the next toss of this coin is the next toss of a 1979 U.S. quarter and that it lands heads if and only if it fails to land tails, and that I will choose to have chocolate ice cream if and only if it lands tails, then "The next toss of this coin lands heads" "The next toss of a 1979 U.S. quarter lands heads" "The next toss of this coin does not land tails" "I will not choose chocolat e ice cream" all fall in the same equivalence class and have the same probability.
The guestion to which we take statisical knowledge to be relevant is the whole equivalence �lass of statements. It is this assumption that ensures that we always have statistical knowledge that bears (relevantly) on any given statement, however unique 2 the subject of that statement. It is also tl;tis assumption that requires us to think about the princioples of statistical relevance: if "5' D r· is in our know lege base, then the same statistical knowledge that is relevant to Smust also be relevant to T.
We assume. as usual. that our knowledge base can be expressed in a first order extensional language. 3 We may still take an individual to be arbitrarily complex: for example it might be a trial of a complicated compound experiment --say an ordered triple consisting of a room in a house. an urn in the room, and a ball in the urn. ( 4) Finally, in order for statistics to be of interest, we must suppose that we may know some things about an individual without knowing everything about it. Thus we might know of "the next trial" that it is a trial consisting of selecting one of a number of urns at random, and then selecting a coin at random from the urn, and then tossing the coin 1 0 times. And then we might be interested in whether the tenth toss landed heads on that trial. or we might know the number of heads among the tosses, and we might be interested in whether the urn was urn number 4. or we might be interested in knowing something about the frequency of two headed coins in the urn from which we got our sample.
Interference I.
We will be concerned with the way in which some items of statistical knowledge can interfere with the epistemic relevance of other items.
If all we know of Tweety is that she is a bird. it is reasonable to believe that she can fly. If we also know that she is a penguin, then it is reasonable to believe that she cannot fly, since our knowledge about the chances of a penguin flying interferes with our knowledge about the chances of a bird flying.
If (as we may in our biological ignorance suppose) there is a rare kind of penguin that .em fly, and if we know that Tweety is one of them. then this new knowledge interferes with our general knowledge about penguins, and again we may suppose tha· t Tweety gnfly.
This relation has been noted by Etherington, Poole, Konolige, and others. It corresponds to what Reichenbach ( 1949) had in mind when he said that we should base our "posits" (degrees of belief) on the "narrowest" reference class concerning which we have adequate statistics. A principle embodyip.g this natural constraint must be stated \'s.rith somewhat more generality than is at first obvious, however.
Suppose (to move to an artificial example) we know of ball# 18 that it is a ball in certain room, and that we know that fifty percent of the · balls in that room are black. Suppose we know also that that particular ball is also one in an urn. urn A, in which 80% are black. The second piece of statistical knowledge is clearly epistemically relevant and the first is not.. This intuition is based on the fact that the set of balls in the urn in the room is a subset of the set of balls in the room.
But maybe we want to know whether the nezt ball to be chosen lrom the room is black. Under the usual conditions of such hypothetical experiments, we are entitled to infer that 50% of the choosings of balls are choosings of black balls. So we may consider the frequency �ith which such choosings are choosings of black balls.
This should be irrelevant since we know that # 18 came from· an urn in which 80% of the balls are black. But the set of balls in that urn isn't a set of choosings at all and so not a subset of the set of objects we are now considering. The subset principle is of no direct help to us. Nor should it be, for it is certainly ir;ttelligible to suppose that while the frequency of black choosings corresponds to the proportion of black balls in general. it fails to do so in the set of choosings ·from urn A. If this is not the case --if we have reason to believe that 80% of the choosings from urn A yield a black ball --then either structure should be acceptable, despite the fact that one concerns. choosings (events) and the other balls(objects).
We � stipulate that all the sentences in question have some specific canonical logical form: but we shall see shortly that that is not such a good idea. What we can do instead is to formula�e our principle a bit more broadly:
The S u bset Principle : Suppose that "a is a B" is in our knowledge base, and that"%( C:B) • p" is in our knowledge base. Suppose that we know that a· is a C if and only if ais a C. The statistical knowledge that a' is a B', and that%( C,B') • p', where pOp', is epistemical1}7irrelevant if we know of a subset of B', B", such that we know both a' is . a B" and %( C,B") -p.
The subset principle is one that has been frequently identified in the context ofnon-monotonic logic. indicates. (Again we see a relation between the application of statistics and non-monotonic logic.) Suppose person#. 18 is known to be a quaker, and that we know that 90% of quakers are pacifists; and also that person # 18 is a republican, and that 20% of republicans are pacifists. It seems clear that neither the 20% nor the 90% are the relevant frequencies. If we knew the proportion of pacifists among republican quakers, we could usefully apply the subset principle, but we.have no reason to suppose that we know this proportion (which. of·course, may have any value from 0 to 1 ). If we allow vague statistical knowledge, we will have knowledge about the iptersection, but it might be only that the proportion of pacifists is somewhere between 0% and 100%.
It is not entirely unreasonable that conflicting information can leave us in a state of ignorance. But sometimes we feel that we can do bettter. There are a number of ways in which we gn do better, though no completely general procedure seems credible.
Interference II.
Here is an example that calls for a second P. rinciple: As before. suppose we have a roomful of urns, and that # �8 designates a ball in the room. Suppose we know that there are 100 balls fu the room, and that SO are black. But suppose we also know that there are 10 urns, that 9 of them containing four black balls and one white ball, and that the tenth contains the remainder of the balls. The relative frequency of black balls in the first nine urns is . 80, and the relative frequency of black balls in the tenth urn is 14155 • .25 ...
Let us consider what statistics are relevant to the statement, "# 18 is black." If we know of# 18 only that it is a ball in the room, it is only the statistics about the frequency of black balls in the room that are relevant. If we know �something about how# 18 came to be the designated ball. the other statistics may also be relevant. For example, we might know that # 18 is the ball resulting from first · choosing an urn at random, and then choosing a ball at random from the chosen urn. If that is the case, the relevant statistics are those governing the proportion of pairs consisting of an urn, and a ball drawn from tha� urn, such that the second member of the pair is black. We can easily calculate the proportion of pairs having this property to be .9 * .8 + .1 * .25 ... •·. 745 ... But we can find a relationship: there is a possible reference class that matches the competitor, of which the correct reference set is. a subset --namely, the cross product of the set of urns and the set of balls. This construction is particularly important in the context of (so-called) Bayesian inference; the model we just looked at corresponds to a non-sampling ca5e in which we have a prior probability of .9 combined with a conditional probability of .8, and a prior probability of .1 combined with a conditional probability of .25 ... We therefore call the rule the Bayesian Principle:
The Bayesian Principle: Suppose that " (a, b . . ) is a B'' is in our knowledge base, and that "%( c;B) -p" is in our knowl�dge base. The statistical knowledge that a' is a C' if and only if ais a G"'that a' is a B', and that �( C ',B')-p' 0 p is epistemicaJJr irrelevantif we know of a cross product of B ·with B" and a corresponding subset C' and a " such that (1) <a ' ,a " > is known to be in B' ¢ B",
�( C', B' ¢ B") =-p ' , and for some B* known to be a subset of B' ¢ B", (4} %(B*, C}-p.
The Bayesian principle is followed in constructing representations of uncertainty in which uncertainties are ·modified by new evidence, but I have not noticed it in discussions of non-monotonic inference. It should be, of course.
Al . most all (species of) . mammals give birth to their young live .. Given an arbitrary individual mammal. we do not have reason to think it give .
s birth to its young live, since half of mammals don't give birth at all. (The analogous point with respect to birds was pointed out by Nutter ( 1987) .) Given an arbitrary individual female mammal. we have reason to think it will give birth to its young live, since almost all species of mammals are such that when their females reproduce, they do it that way. (Almost all the reproductive ba1ls in almost all the urns are white, though it is not th� case that almost all the balls in an urn are reproductive . . ) We accommodate the ovoviviparous platypus by noting that its species (its urn} is unusual.
Interference III. ·
The final principle of relevance we need for dealing with statistical knowledge is in a sense the dual of our first principle, the subset principle. Suppose that we are_ sampling from a population Cwith a view to making an inference about the propprtion of B's there are' in C It is a gen�ral set theoretical fact that almost all subsets of a given set reflect within narrow limits the comp<;>sition of the parent set. It is consistent with this observation that we should have observed more. Cs than we mentioned explicitly. This should render the previous numbers irrelevant. The larger sample is the one that is epistemically relevant. A principle that captures this intuition is:
The Supersample Principle:· Suppose that we know ·�hat a n is a member of p7and that we are interested in the chance that a n is /?a. The statist. ical knowledge that am is known to be a member of Jft1. that a Ill is a It if and only if a n is �r 0 . and that�( Ira,p7) =p D p'= OJ.(Ir'..l;/11 ) is epJ:ftem!c:zllJ' irrelevant if we also know that" a 01 is a subset of a n .
It is my belief that �he�e three principles are a� the principles we n eed to detetmine the epistemic relevance of statistical knowledge in the case in which we either have exact knowledge �r none at all. It may be that other principles are needed, but I have seen no examples that intuitively require additional principles. · Should they be called ''principles?" It seems to me that they ·should, and that they are all roughly on a par, even though the subset principles is derivable from the Bayesian principle. They may be construed collectively as an articulation of our intuitive ideas about "total evidence. "
The first principle directs us to use· the most specific evidence at hand. The second directs us to take account of general.background knowledge. The third says not to ignore available data. Stated thus they seem sensible enough. ( 1) If we accept the equivalence condition --that statements connnected in our knowledge base by a biconditional should have the same probability --then many more statements than might at first have been thought can have probabilities based on statistical background knowledge. ( 2) There are three intuitive ways in which conflict between two potential reference classes can be resolved to the benefit of one of them.
